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Summary 
The Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (the Department) has failed to learn 
lessons from past policies such as Individual Learning Accounts. It failed to heed warnings 
from organisations such as the Higher Education Funding Council and University and 
College Union. The Department allowed the rapid expansion of support for students 
attending private Higher Education providers. The Department allowed £3.84 million of 
public money to be given to ineligible EU students in the form of student loans and grants. 
Furthermore the Department has been unable to quantify how much money has been lost 
when it has funded students who have failed to attend, or failed to complete courses, or 
were not proficient in the English language, or were not entered for qualifications, or where 
courses themselves were poorly taught. The Department took over a year to tighten up 
some of its procedures to control public expenditure more effectively. 
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Introduction 
Approximately 140 institutions offering higher education are termed ‘alternative 
providers’. These alternative providers comprise a diverse range of organisations ranging 
from private companies to charitable institutions. They do not receive government grants 
directly but do access public funding through student loans which are used to pay their 
fees. Following the announcement of higher education reforms in 2011, and the associated 
increase in tuition fee loans, there has been substantial and rapid growth in the sector. 40% 
of the publicly funded students attending these colleges are EU students, compared to 6% 
in the rest of the higher education sector. Between 2010/11 and 2013/14, the number of 
students claiming support for courses at alternative providers rose from 7,000 to 53,000. 
Over the same period, the total amount of public money paid to students at alternative 
providers, through tuition fee loans and maintenance loans and grants, has risen from 
around £50 million to around £675 million. The Department has overall responsibility for 
oversight of publicly-funded higher education, including alternative providers with 
publicly-funded students. The Student Loans Company is responsible for paying out loans 
and grants to students. 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
1. The Department pressed ahead with the expansion of the alternative provider 
sector without a robust legislative framework to protect public money. Since the 
Government announced higher education reforms in 2010, there have been multiple 
warnings about the risks associated with a rapid expansion of the private higher 
education sector. In particular, this Committee, the Higher Education Funding 
Council for England (HEFCE) and the University and College Union raised 
concerns about proceeding without a robust regulatory framework. Although it 
became clear in 2012 that the legislation required to establish a new regulatory 
framework would not be passed within the current Parliament, the Department 
continued with implementation but failed to think through how it would manage the 
risks in the absence of the expected legislative powers. In particular the Department 
has no rights of access to alternative providers. In these circumstances, the 
Accounting Officer at the Department could have sought a Ministerial Direction to 
proceed, but did not, so must bear responsibility. 
Recommendation: Accounting Officers should not proceed with implementing 
schemes without being assured that risks can be appropriately managed. If risks to 
public money cannot be sufficiently controlled, whether through legislative or other 
means, they should seek a Ministerial Direction. 
2. The Department failed to identify and act quickly on known risks associated with 
the rapid introduction of schemes to widen access to learning. The Department 
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did not learn from previous Government experience, in particular the introduction 
of Individual Learning Accounts where rapid expansion led to serious problems. 
Furthermore, the Department has been slow to react to warning signs. The rapid 
expansion in numbers was concentrated in five colleges that accounted for 50% of 
the expansion. 20% of students receiving funding were not registered for a 
qualification and drop-out rates were very high in some institutions. There was also 
evidence from whistleblowers that proficiency in English language was not tested, 
that some institutions were recruiting students on the streets, and that students 
claiming funding were not attending colleges. Rather than respond to the warning 
signs by conducting a broader investigation, the Department chose to focus on 
specific issues and specific providers, and even then has failed to apply adequate 
sanctions in some cases. 
Recommendation: The Department must systematically assess and control the 
specific risks identified by the National Audit Office and at our evidence session, 
and provide us with a clear explanation of how it will manage these risks in future. 
3. The Department does not know how much public money may have been wasted. 
The Department has not attempted any calculation of the total financial impact of its 
weak oversight. The Department was able to tell us that it had paid out £3.84m to EU 
students who were not eligible for student loans. The Department’s record in 
collecting monies from EU students is already poor. Furthermore, it did not know 
how much public money may have been wasted where larger than expected numbers 
of students have failed to complete their qualifications, or how much funding has 
gone towards paying for additional EU students rather than for the intended purpose 
of widening access to higher education for students in England. The Department also 
does not know why there is a 20% difference between the number of students 
enrolled with alternative providers and the number registered with the qualification 
awarding body and whether this represented a misuse of public funds. It has not 
established whether there has been any waste of public money as a consequence. 
Recommendation: The Department should report back to us urgently with an 
assessment of how much public money is at risk of being wasted. 
4. The Department has failed to protect the interests of legitimate students, the 
taxpayer and the reputation of those alternative providers who may be 
performing well. The Higher Education Statistics Agency provides published data to 
enable students and others to assess and compare the performance of higher 
education institutions. No data is provided to assess the performance of private 
providers. In particular, whistleblowers told us that some institutions admitted 
students with unacceptably low fluency in English who were therefore not equipped 
to pursue qualifications for which they had enrolled. These students will have a poor 
experience, may fail or drop out, and will have taken on significant loans they may be 
unable to repay. With no reliable data, the reputation of all private higher education 
colleges is tarnished by the unacceptable standards in a few of the colleges. 
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Recommendation: The Department needs to ensure that it has a much firmer grip 
on the quality of teaching and the standard the students can expect in private sector 
higher education colleges. It needs to identify poor performers and take appropriate 
action to protect students and the sector as a whole. 
5. The Department does not monitor what it is achieving from expansion of the 
alternative provider sector. One of the objectives of the Government’s higher 
education reforms was to improve student choice by supporting a more diverse 
sector. More opportunities for part-time study, sandwich courses or distance 
learning were intended to widen access for groups who were previously less likely to 
enter higher education, for example older students or those on low incomes. 
However, the Department did not define any measures that would allow it to judge 
whether implementation of the policy has been successful. Furthermore, the 
Department has not collected sufficient data on the alternative provider sector, such 
as the number of students from lower socio-economic groups who have gained a 
higher education qualification. Such information would help the Department assess 
whether the policy is working. 
Recommendation: The Department needs to set specific, measurable objectives for 
this policy, and collect and analyse the right data in order to evaluate the full 
impact, taking account of any unanticipated impacts, such as the recruitment of EU 
students. 
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1 Oversight of the alternative provider 
sector 
1. On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from 
the Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (the Department), the Student Loans 
Company, the Higher Education Funding Council in England (HEFCE) and the awarding 
body for Higher National qualifications, Edexcel, about financial support for students at 
alternative higher education providers.1 Approximately 140 institutions offering higher 
education are termed ‘alternative providers’. They include a diverse range of organisations 
from private companies to charitable institutions. Alternative providers benefit from the 
public funding provided to students via tuition fee loans.2 
2. In June 2011, the government published a white paper that introduced measures 
designed to encourage diversity and competition in the higher education sector. In 
particular, the government increased the maximum tuition fee loan available to students 
studying at alternative providers, from £3,375 to £6,000 a year.3 
3. Evidence submitted to us, including from whistleblowers, highlighted a number of issues 
relating to the implementation of these changes:4 
• The number of non-UK EU students at alternative providers claiming student 
support is now around 40% of the total publicly funded student cohort attending 
private colleges; 
• £3.84m of student support paid to EU students who were not eligible for it; 
• Dropout rates higher than 20% at some alternative providers; 
• Evidence of inappropriate recruitment practices with colleges recruiting on the 
streets; 
• Indications that students are not being registered for their qualifications; and 
• Indications that some students were accepted onto courses without adequate 
English language skills. 
4. Following announcement of the higher education reforms, various bodies and 
stakeholders had warned the Department about the consequences of expanding the 
alternative provider sector without a robust regulatory framework to protect public money. 
In particular, this Committee recommended that the change in higher education funding 
1 C&AG’s Report, Investigation into financial support for students at alternative higher education providers, Session 
2014-15, HC 861, 2 December 2014 
2 C&AG’s Report paras 1.1, 1.8 
3 Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, Higher Education: Students at the Heart of the System, white paper, 
Cm 8122, June 2011; C&AG’s Report para 1.4 
4 Qq 20, 72, 80, 86-87, 226; C&AG’s Report paras 7-8, 2.2, 2.11-2.12 
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arrangements would require a new system of regulation and accountability. We 
recommended that new powers would be required to regulate institutions that receive little 
or no direct public funding but whose students have access to publicly-provided loans 
which are used to pay the institutions’ fees.5 HEFCE and the University and College Union 
also raised concerns about the risks and the need for new regulatory powers.6 
5. The Department initially planned to bring forward legislation to establish a new 
regulatory role for HEFCE from the 2013/14 academic year.7 However, when, in 2012, it 
became clear to the Department that there would be no new legislation within this 
Parliament, the Accounting Officer did not seek a Ministerial Direction to proceed with 
implementation of the policy in the absence of legislation. The Accounting Officer told us 
that it would be very helpful to have legislation as early as possible following formation of a 
new Parliament in 2015.8 
6. The Department could not demonstrate that it had drawn on previous government 
experience before proceeding with expansion of the alternative provider sector. In 2003, 
our predecessor Committee reported on the implementation of Individual Learning 
Accounts by the former Department for Education & Skills. Under the scheme, which was 
intended to widen participation in learning and reduce financial barriers faced by learners, 
particularly amongst those who lacked skills and qualifications, private providers received 
public funding for running training courses. However, our predecessors concluded that the 
scheme had been poorly thought-through, had been put in place too quickly, and lacked 
adequate risk assessment and risk management.9 Although many of the issues were similar 
when the Department implemented the 2011 higher education reforms, the Department 
does not appear to have taken lessons from Individual Learning Accounts into account 
when considering how it would oversee the expansion of provision by alternative 
providers.10 
7. The Department was then slow to identify and respond to warning signs that the 
alternative provider sector was not developing in the way originally anticipated. Between 
2010/11 and 2013/14 the numbers of students attending alternative providers grew from 
7,000 to 53,000. Half of the total growth is accounted for by just five providers.11 These 
providers are also amongst those with higher numbers of ineligible student loan applicants 
or high dropout rates. The Department acknowledged that the growth of the sector was 
much greater than expected and that, although in 2013 and 2014 it took action to limit 
further growth, it was a fair challenge that it should have responded earlier.12 
5 HC Committee of Public Accounts, Regulating financial sustainability in higher education, Thirty-sixth report of 
Session 2010-12, HC 914, June 2011 
6 Qq 10-11, 62, 108 
7 C&AG’s Report para 1.14 
8 Qq 100, 108, 242 
9 Committee of Public Accounts, Individual Learning Accounts, tenth report of Session 2002-03, HC 544, April 2003 
10 Qq 6, 63, 110-122 
11 C&AG’s Report para 1.6, Figure 2; Qq 62, 65 
12 Qq 63-65; C&AG’s report paras 1.9-1.10 
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8. Another signal that the expansion of the alternative provider sector was leading to 
unintended consequences was large numbers of applications for student loans from 
ineligible EU students. The Student Loans Company told us that, at the time of the hearing, 
£3.84m had been paid out in student support to 832 EU students who had either chosen 
not to or had been unable to prove that they met eligibility criteria on residency.13 
Payments were made to ineligible students because the Student Loans Company did not 
routinely require supporting evidence to confirm applicants met residency criteria. The 
Student Loans Company told us that the process has now been tightened.14 
9. We asked the Department what it had done to investigate evidence in the NAO report of 
inappropriate recruitment by some alternative providers, such as advertising higher 
education courses as if they were English language training or paid employment.15 We 
highlighted further cases where we have been told that some providers were recruiting by 
approaching prospective students on the streets.16 Although the Department asks 
alternative providers whether they are using recruitment agents, it told us that it has not 
conducted a specific investigation into the activities of recruitment agents because this is 
outside of the scope of its statutory remit.17 
10. There have been a number of cases where the Department has investigated individual 
providers about specific issues, such as student attendance rates, and the Department told 
us that it has responded to concerns about the sector by increasing the Student Loans 
Company’s budget for tackling fraud. However, the Department told us that while it can 
look into allegations, it has to follow legal processes and cannot proceed without sufficient 
evidence.18 The Department has no rights of access to alternative providers and this affects 
the extent to which it can investigate when concerns are raised.19 Nevertheless, the 
Department has not taken practical steps to establish whether, for example, providers are 
recruiting prospective students from the streets.20 Nor has it carried out broader 
investigations into the issues identified by the NAO, such as data suggesting that 20% more 
students are claiming student loans than have been registered with the qualification 
awarding body. Unless students are registered, they will not be able to attain the 
qualification they have enrolled for.21 
11. The Department’s oversight arrangements are failing to protect the interests of 
legitimate students and the reputation of those providers who may be performing well. 
Higher education institutions that receive funding from HEFCE are required to provide 
performance data to the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA). HEFCE uses this 
13 Qq 86-98 
14 Qq 104, 125 
15 Qq 81, 188-194; C&AG’s report paras 2.11-2.12, Appendix Five 
16 Qq 204-206; 222-224 
17 Qq 190-197 
18 Qq 203-212, 218-225 
19 C&AG’s report para 1.15 
20 Qq 226-231 
21 Qq 50-61 
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data to produce benchmarks, identify which institutions need more attention, and which 
institutions merit a lighter touch. Although for the 2014/15 academic year onwards, 
alternative providers are also required to provide this data to HESA, comparable data on 
alternative providers is not yet available.22 Therefore, it is difficult for prospective students 
to assess the relative performance of alternative providers, and the Department is also 
unable to identify which providers are doing well and which may require more intense 
scrutiny.23 
12. Qualification awarding bodies, rather than the Department, set minimum entry 
requirements for higher education qualifications. In the case of Higher National 
qualifications, Edexcel does not specify entry requirements but, regarding English 
language, recommends that all students should be at least between level 4 and level 5 in the 
International English Language Testing System (IELTS).24 We asked Edexcel whether it 
thought that this was a reasonable level of English to be taking a Higher National 
qualification. Edexcel told us that it has decided to introduce an entry requirement for 
English language and will be consulting on the appropriate level, which could be IELTS 
level 5.5 or above.25 In the meantime, low entry requirements may have led to students 
without the required ability being accepted onto courses, struggling with language and 
consequently dropping out, contributing to the high dropout rates at alternative providers 
reported by the NAO.26 
 
2 Securing value from the sector 
13. When the government introduced changes to allow expansion of the alternative 
provider sector, one of its key policy objectives was to improve student choice by 
supporting a more diverse sector, with more opportunities for part-time or accelerated 
courses, distance learning and higher-level vocational study. This would widen 
participation in higher education, particularly amongst groups who have not traditionally 
had such opportunities. Although this high-level aim was clear, the Department did not 
develop specific measures that would allow it to monitor the extent to which it was 
achieving the policy objectives.27 In particular, the Department was not able to tell us what 
impact it expects from the expansion of alternative providers in terms of outcomes for their 
students and the longer-term potential benefits of the sector for the wider UK economy.28 
22 Qq 22, 100, 108, 239 
23 Qq 174, 239 
24 C&AG’s report paras 3.16-3.17; Q 156 
25 Qq 156-165 
26 Q 186 
27 Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, Higher Education: Students at the Heart of the System, white paper, 
Cm 8122, June 2011; Q240 
28 Q 240 
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14. Furthermore, the Department is not collecting information that would help it 
determine whether or not the expansion of the sector is working. Some providers may be 
achieving more towards the government’s aim of increasing diversity and participation, 
and the NAO has provided evidence that some providers may be performing well in some 
respects. For example, the NAO report shows that some providers have dropout rates that 
are lower than those of many publicly-funded providers.29 However, the Department lacks 
sufficient information on what the better-performing alternative providers are doing 
differently and whether older students or those on low incomes are gaining qualifications.30 
15. The Student Loans Company paid out a total of £1.271 billion in financial support for 
students at alternative providers in the four years from 2010/11 to 2013/14.31 We 
questioned the Department and the Student Loans Company over how much of this 
money was spent in ways not originally intended or expected. Although the Department 
had identified some elements of the cost it was not able to provide us with an overall figure. 
It did not think it would have a full figure until a full cohort of students completes its 
studies, in two to three years’ time.32 
16. In introducing its reforms, the government intended to widen access for students in 
England who previously had fewer opportunities to enter higher education. However, 
approximately 40% of publicly-funded students at alternative providers come from the rest 
of the EU, compared with 6% of students in the rest of the higher education sector.33 While 
some EU students will be UK residents, others will return to EU member states after their 
studies and it is more difficult for the Student Loans Company to recover loans from EU 
students resident overseas than from students resident in the UK.34 The Student Loans 
Company told us that, across the higher education sector, there are 22,000 EU borrowers 
living overseas with a total debt of £145 million. A third of these borrowers are in arrears, 
owing a total of £19 million. We are concerned that public money may be lost if large 
numbers of EU students at alternative providers fail to repay their loans.35 
17. The Department expects to recover some of the £3.84 million paid out for the 832 
ineligible EU students. Of the total £3.84 million, £951,000 has been recovered and the 
Student Loans Company expects to recover £442,000 million from future payments to 
alternative providers. The Student Loans Company will pursue the remaining £2.447 
million from individual students.36 It has not estimated its potential loss after taking 
account of anticipated recoveries.37 
29 C&AG’s report Figure 7, Figure 8 
30 Qq 1-4, 238-246 
31 Qq 248; C&AG’s report Figure 2 
32 Qq 6-19, 248-253 
33 Q 80; C&AG’s report para 2.2 
34 Qq 78, 80 
35 Qq 80, 133-155 
36 Qq 86-98, Q128 
37 Qq 133-138 
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18. The Department told us that it lacked data to allow it to readily estimate how much 
public money was at stake when larger numbers of students than expected failed to 
complete their qualifications.38 Dropout rates were higher than 20% at nine alternative 
providers in 2012/13.39 The Department expects dropout to be higher on average in 
alternative providers than in the traditional HEFCE-funded sector due to factors such as 
students at alternative providers often being older or from lower socio-economic 
backgrounds.40 However, the Department has not defined an expectation of what might 
constitute an acceptable dropout rate, or investigated those providers with high dropout 
rates. The Department has also not examined to what extent high dropout rates indicate a 
poor quality of teaching and support, and the impact this might have on genuine 
students.41 
19. There is a 20% difference between the number of Higher National students enrolled 
with alternative providers and the number registered with Edexcel, the qualification 
awarding body. The Department was not able to explain the difference although it told us it 
was pursuing the matter with Edexcel.42 However neither Edexcel nor the Department 
knew for how long the 20% gap had existed. The Department told us that it would be 
introducing a measure to prevent unregistered students from receiving student support but 
that this would not be in place until January 2015.43 The Department had not carried out 
any investigation to reconcile the difference in the data, or to confirm the absence of fraud 
in the system.44 
38 Qq 248-253 
39 Q 72; C&AG’s report para 3.4, Figures 7 and 9 
40 Qq 71, 237-238, 248; C&AG’s report paras 3.8-3.9 
41 Qq 72-73, 186-187, 248-249; C&AG’s report para 3.10 
42 Q 20; C&AG’s report para 3.13 
43 Qq 25-30, 35, 42-45 
44 Qq 38, 48-61 
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Formal Minutes 
Monday 2 February 2015 
 
Members present: 
Mrs Margaret Hodge, in the Chair 
Mr Richard Bacon 
Guto Bebb 
Mr David Burrowes 
Stephen Hammond 
 
 
 Chris Heaton-Harris 
Stewart Jackson 
Austin Mitchell 
John Pugh 
 
Draft Report (Financial support for students at alternative higher education providers), 
proposed by the Chair, brought up and read. 
Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph. 
Paragraphs 1 to 19 read and agreed to. 
Conclusions and recommendations agreed to. 
Summary agreed to. 
Resolved, That the Report be the Forty-first Report of the Committee to the House. 
Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House. 
Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the 
provisions of Standing Order No. 134. 
 
[Adjourned till Monday 9 February at 3.00pm 
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The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the 
Committee’s inquiry page at www.parliament.uk/pac. 
Martin Donnelly, Permanent Secretary, Department for Business, Innovation 
and Skills; Professor Madeleine Atkins, Chief Executive, Higher Education 
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inquiry web page at www.parliament.uk/pac. CHE numbers are generated by the evidence 
processing system and so may not be complete. 
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2 Department Of Business, Innovation And Skills (CHE0002) 
3 Pearson (CHE0001) 
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